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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The advent of new communication technologies has brought with it the classic 
struggle of who should regulate its content.  Should the industry, the market, or the 
government regulate such content?  Perhaps no one should.  Various anti-indecency 
media groups have voiced their concern about wireless adult content.1  Some groups 
suggest a complete ban of adult content on wireless devices, while others suggest the 
regulation of wireless content via the indecency standards of traditional radio or 
television broadcasting.2   
One group, Morality in Media, Inc., has recommended in its formal Comment3 to 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that if the FCC chooses to allow 
cell phone use on commercial flights, a “smoking section” or something with a 
similar effect should be established to protect passengers from unwanted content.4  
This idea conjures up the bygone era of when the airlines permitted in-flight 
smoking.  The proposal of a cell phone section for airline flights may provide the 
specter of regulation, but most likely, it will be as effective in protecting passengers 
from adult images as smoking sections were in protecting non-smoking passengers 
from secondhand smoke.5 
Some commentators believe the regulation of wireless content on airplanes is just 
a disguised attempt to press the FCC into regulating all wireless content.6  The main 
agenda of these anti-indecency media groups is to rid the airwaves, including cable 
and satellite, of all forms of so-called indecency.7  If these groups are successful in 
creating a ban on wireless adult content on airplanes, then this precedent creates an 
opportunity to extend the ban beyond the airline setting.  If that attempt is successful, 
then the ban could extend to other technologies that are currently protected from 
government regulation.  The patent core issue is whether the scope of the FCC’s 
regulatory authority extends to the content of wireless broadband transmissions.     
                                                                
1See Mark Rockwell, Buckle Up, There’s Rough Air Ahead, WIRELESS WEEK, Sept. 1, 
2005 at 12. 
2Id. 
3Letter from Paul J. McGeady, Attorney, Morality in Media, to FCC (May 26, 2005), 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (enter Morality in Media in the 
"filed on behalf of" field, then enter 5/26/2005 in the "search by specific date" field). 
4Id. at 9. 
5See SecondHand Smoke: Unsafe in Any Amount, HARV. MED. SCH. FAM. HEALTH GUIDE, 
Nov. 2004, http://www.health.harvard.edu/fhg/updates/update1104c.shtml. 
6See Rockwell, supra note 1. 
7See, e.g., American Family Association, http://www.afa.net/pornography/internet.asp 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007); Morality in Media, Inc., http://www.moralityinmedia.org (follow 
“Radio/TV Indecency” hyperlink)(last visited Sept. 4, 2007); Parents Television Council, 
http://www.parentstv.org (follow “Current Campaigns” hyperlink, then follow “Broadcast 
Indecency” hyperlink)(last visited Sept. 4, 2007). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/6
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The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) established the FCC as 
the authority to regulate wired and wireless communications in the United States.8  
Since 1934, the FCC and the technologies it regulates have changed dramatically.9  
Specifically, the regulation of broadcast indecency and obscenity has certainly seen 
significant changes over the years.10  Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 
1464 prohibits obscene or indecent speech by means of radio communication.11  The 
question then becomes: Do broadband transmissions to wireless devices constitute 
radio communication that may be regulated by the FCC under § 1464? 
The FCC has used § 1464 to enforce broadcast indecency of radio and television 
in landmark cases resolved by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit and by the United States Supreme Court.12  In these cases, the courts 
established tests to determine indecency and what broadcast media the government 
may regulate.13  In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, Chief Justice Burger recognized the difficulties of regulating broadcast 
content when he wrote: “The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult 
because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; 
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable 
today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.”14  Wireless devices have evolved 
beyond the grasp of § 1464 and the FCC authority, leaving any attempt to regulate 
the content of wireless devices inadequate and precisely outmoded.  The wished-for 
regulation of wireless content transmissions exceeds the boundaries of the FCC’s 
regulatory authority; therefore, the FCC regulations proposed by the anti-indecency 
                                                                
8Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
9Policing indecent content has proved to be more challenging as methods of 
communication evolve.  Radio and television continue to be the media most highly regulated 
by the FCC, whereas the Internet has escaped the indecency parameters of the traditional 
forms of broadcast.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)(holding law prohibiting 
transmission of indecent or patently offensive material to persons under 18 unconstitutional). 
10In the past, the typical complaint received by the FCC dealt with indecent language aired 
on a radio or television broadcast.  In addition to those typical complaints, the FCC now must 
deal with televised nudity and partial nudity, radio shock jocks, Internet pornography, and so 
forth.  One dramatic change is the organized complaint filing effort of a few anti-indecency 
media groups.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.  Using the Internet, these groups communicate 
more efficiently with their members and are able to blitz the FCC with hundreds of thousands 
of complaints a year.  See Jerry Del Colliano, Report Says Nearly All FCC Indecency 
Complaints From Same Organization, AUDIO VIDEO REVOLUTION, Jan. 6, 2005, 
http://www.avrev.com/news/0105/6.indecency.html.  This high level of organization allows 
these groups to target one specific show or incident if they so desire.  Some argue that these 
groups wield a significant amount of influence over FCC policy and have placed indecency 
issues in the national spotlight.  Id. 
1118 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
12See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children’s Television 
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Act III); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 
F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Act II); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Act I). 
13See cases cited supra note 12. 
14Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). 
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media groups to regulate wireless content create a slippery slope on which the First 
Amendment rights of all forms of communication transmissions may fall.   
This Note will argue that the scope of the FCC’s authority to regulate traditional 
broadcast content does not extend to the content transmitted to wireless devices via 
broadband transmission.  Part II of this Note provides a study of the key cases that 
characterize the scope of the FCC’s statutory authority to regulate traditional 
broadcast content.  Additionally, Part II presents a discussion of the First 
Amendment and the limits it imposes on the FCC’s regulation of broadcast content.  
Part III evaluates whether content transmitted by new technologies fits into the 
regulatory scope of the FCC’s authority according to the tests set forth in previous 
United States Supreme Court cases.  Part IV briefly discusses the influence of 
politics on FCC policy.  Finally, Part V presents the possible effects the regulation of 
wireless content by the FCC will have on the rights of free speech and commerce in 
the United States. 
II.  DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF FCC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INDECENCY 
A.  A History of Establishing FCC Statutory Authority 
The rapid growth of radio communications in the early 1900s prompted the 
United States government to adopt regulatory legislation, but all of these attempts 
left some major issues unresolved; chiefly, the separation of control within the 
government over radio communications.15  The Communications Act unified the 
regulation of wired and wireless communications under one federal jurisdiction.16  
The philosophical structure behind the Act stems from eight key assumptions of the 
Radio Act of 1927.17  The eight defining assumptions of the Radio Act of 1927 are: 
(1) The radio waves belong to the people. 
(2) Licensees must serve the public. 
(3) All of the public should receive benefits.  
(4) Not all applicants are eligible to receive a license.  
(5) Broadcasting has distinct features.  
(6) Broadcast expression is protected by the First Amendment.  
(7) The government maintains discretionary regulatory authority.  
(8) Governmental authority is not absolute.18   
Additionally, Section 1 of the Communications Act precisely states its purpose:  
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, 
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with 
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national 
defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through 
                                                                
15See F. LESLIE SMITH, ET AL., ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT: THE REGULATION OF 
WIRELESS AND WIRED MASS COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 33-41 (1995). 
1647 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
17SMITH, supra note 15, at 42-43. 
18Id.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/6
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the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing 
a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority 
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional 
authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and 
radio communication, there is created a commission to be known as the 
“Federal Communications Commission,” which shall be constituted as 
hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions 
of this [chapter].19   
This combination of philosophy and purpose remains the fundamental framework 
for the regulation of broadcasting in the United States.20  With the power now 
granted to the FCC by Congress, the FCC may regulate the broadcast content of 
radio and television transmissions.21  
To begin a study of content regulation by the FCC, obscenity must be 
distinguished from indecency.  In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court 
established three elements that must be satisfied for content to qualify as obscene: 
 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest . . . 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.22  
If the content satisfies all three prongs of the Miller test, then the First Amendment 
does not protect the content if disseminated in any form.23  In broadcasting, the 
distinction becomes unclear because § 1464 includes the words “obscene” and 
“indecent” in its stated definition by punishing anyone who “utters any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication . . . .”24   
During the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC made many early attempts to regulate and 
define the term “indecent” so that a station would appeal to a federal court.25  In 
1970, the FCC made a concerted effort for judicial review of what the FCC 
                                                                
19§ 151. 
20SMITH, supra note 15, at 43. 
21The Act has had several major changes, most of which allowed for the growth of the 
communications capabilities in the United States.  Amendments to the Act have provided for 
the growth of television, cable, and commercial satellite use.  These amendments have been 
necessary because the drafters of the original Act could not have prepared for the technologies 
yet to be developed.  SMITH, supra note 15, at 44-45. 
22Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
23Id. at 36. 
2418 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
25KIMBERLY ZARKIN, ANTI-INDECENCY GROUPS AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 36, 42 (2003). 
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considered indecent broadcasting.26  One such attempt occurred when the FCC fined 
a radio station for broadcasting a taped interview with Jerry Garcia, the front-man for 
the rock band The Grateful Dead.27  The fine was in response to two four-letter 
words that Garcia “frequently interspersed” in his comments during the interview.28  
The FCC concluded that the speech was indecent by stating: “[T]he speech involved 
has no redeeming social value, and is patently offensive by contemporary 
community standards, with very serious consequences to the ‘public interest in the 
larger and more effective use of radio [].’”29  The radio station paid the $100 fine 
leaving the FCC claim of indecency unchallenged.30  
It was not until the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that the 
Supreme Court cleared up this distinction of what constitutes broadcast indecency, 
albeit very narrowly.31  On October 30, 1973, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, a 
New York radio station, owned by Pacifica Foundation, aired a pre-recorded twelve 
minute monologue by George Carlin entitled “Filthy Words.”32  The monologue 
discussed the seven dirty words one could not say on the public airwaves.33  The 
FCC received only one complaint regarding the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue.34  
In response to the complaint, the FCC issued a declaratory order on February 12, 
1975, finding the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue indecent.35  Additionally, the 
order defined indecency as “language that describes, in terms patently offens[ive] as 
                                                                
26In In re WUHY-FM, the FCC stated:  
We believe that a most crucial peg underlying all Commission action in the 
programming field is the vital consideration that the courts are there to review and 
reverse any action which runs afoul of the First Amendment.  Thus, while we think 
that our action is fully consistent with the law, there should clearly be the avenue of 
court review in a case of this nature [].  Indeed, we would welcome such review, since 
only in that way can the pertinent standards be definitively determined. 
In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 415 (1970). 
27Id. at 408. 
28Id. at 409.  Garcia used the words shit and fuck.  Id. 
29Id. at 410 (citation omitted). 
30ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 42 (citing Don M. Gilmore et al., The Regulation of Electronic 
Media, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 825-28 (1990)). 
31See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978). 
32Id. at 729-30. 
33Id. at 729.  The seven dirty words, according to Carlin, are: shit, piss, fuck, cunt, 
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.  GEORGE CARLIN, Filthy Words, on OCCUPATION: FOOLE 
(Little David Records 1973). 
34Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.  Interestingly,  
[t]he complaint was made by a Florida resident who lived outside the range of the 
station’s signal and who was a member of the national planning board of Morality in 
Media.  His “young son” who was with him in the car when he heard the monologue 
was fifteen years old. 
JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST INDECENCY: F.C.C. REGULATION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 42 (1997). 
35Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730, 732. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/6
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measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual 
or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk 
that children may be in the audience.”36  The FCC did not issue a fine against 
Pacifica but did place a copy of the order in the radio station’s file.37 
With support from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Pacifica sought 
judicial review of the order by appealing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit.38  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the order represented 
censorship prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 32639 or, alternatively, that the order was 
unconstitutionally overbroad.40  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on an appeal 
by the FCC.41 
Written by Justice Stevens, the plurality opinion of the Court in Pacifica listed 
four issues to be decided: 
(1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more than the 
Commission’s determination that the monologue was indecent “as broadcast”; 
(2) whether the Commission’s order was a form of censorship forbidden  
by § 326;  
(3) whether the broadcast was indecent within the meaning of § 1464; and 
(4) whether the order violates the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.42 
Justice Stevens answered the two statutory questions separately, albeit he 
acknowledged the two provisions have a common origin.43  Therefore, this section of 
the Note focuses on the statutory questions presented in issues (2) and (3), while the 
following section discusses the First Amendment question presented in issue (4). 
Pacifica argued that § 326, which prohibits the censorship of broadcasts by the 
FCC,44 denied the FCC any power to censor its broadcast content.45  Justice Stevens 
made it clear in his opinion that § 326 had “never been construed to deny the 
Commission the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the 
                                                                
36In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI-FM, ,56 F.C.C.2d 94, 
98 (1975). 
37Id. at 99.  
38ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 45-46. 
39Section 326 provides:  
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the 
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any 
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the 
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication. 
42 U.S.C. § 326 (2006). 
40Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (1977). 
41ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 47. 
42FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978). 
43Id. at 735. 
44§ 326. 
45Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734. 
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performance of its regulatory duties.”46  Justice Stevens cited numerous cases 
decided by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that consistently agreed with 
this construction of § 326.47  He reached this conclusion after stating that “[section] 
326 does not limit the Commission’s authority to impose sanctions on licensees who 
engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting.”48  After nullifying Pacifica’s 
§ 326 censorship argument, Justice Stevens then dismissed the statutory question 
surrounding § 1464.49  
The FCC recognized that several words used in Carlin’s monologue fell squarely 
within the FCC’s definition of indecency.50  Pacifica took issue with the FCC’s 
definition of indecency, but agreed that the afternoon broadcast was patently 
offensive.51  Pacifica’s position was that the broadcast was not indecent within the 
meaning of § 1464 because of the absence of prurient appeal.52  Although Pacifica 
built a strong argument, Justice Stevens rejected Pacifica’s construction of § 1464.53 
Pacifica asserted that the Court, in previous decisions, “construed the term 
‘indecent’ in related statutes to mean ‘obscene,’ as that term was defined in Miller.”54  
Specifically, Pacifica referred to 18 U.S.C. § 146155 and the construction the Court 
gave § 1461 in Hamling v. United States.56  Pacifica stressed the Court’s holding in 
Hamling that a disjunctive phrase contained in § 1461 is limited to mean obscene; 
therefore, the similar disjunctive phrase in § 1464 should also be limited to mean 
obscene, thereby necessitating the element of a prurient appeal.57  With the absence 
                                                                
46Id. at 735 (emphasis added).  
47See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 173-74, n.3 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[C]anceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of 
improper programming . . . would not be prohibited censorship, . . . programs containing such 
material are grounds for denial of a license renewal”)(internal quotation marks omitted); 
KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (“[T]he 
commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant’s past conduct, 
which is not censorship”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969); Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bay State Beacon, 
Inc. v. FCC, 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
48Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738. 
49See id. at 738-41. 
50Id. at 739. 
51Id. 
52Id. 
53Id. at 741. 
54Id. at 740. 
55Section 1461 addresses “[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, 
matter, thing, device, or substance . . . .” 
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006). 
56Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
57Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40. 
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of the prurient appeal element, the Court could not deem the broadcast indecent 
within the meaning of the statute.58   
In response to Pacifica’s contentions, Justice Stevens interpreted the plain 
language of § 1464.59  He concluded that because the phrase “obscene, indecent, or 
profane”60 was written in the disjunctive, each word must have a separate meaning.61  
He stated that “prurient appeal is an element of the obscene,” but described the term 
indecent according to Webster’s dictionary as, “nonconformance with accepted 
standards of morality.”62  Justice Stevens reasoned that Hamling’s construction of     
§ 1461 did not relate to § 1464 by stating each statute applies to two different 
media.63  He concluded by stating that “neither our prior decisions nor the language 
or history of § 1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential 
component of indecent language . . . . [Therefore], we reject Pacifica’s construction 
of the statute.”64 
After the Pacifica ruling, the FCC has the statutory authority and judicial 
approval to pursue the regulation of indecency on the airwaves.  The rule established 
by Pacifica was apparent for broadcasters: Avoid the “seven dirty words” to 
circumvent sanction by the FCC.65  Surprisingly, the FCC was virtually silent in their 
mission to control broadcast indecency for the next ten years.66  The silence stopped 
with the emergence of a new type of radio broadcaster known as the “shock jock.”67  
Complaints flooded the FCC in response to this style of “innuendo-laden humor.”68  
As a result, the FCC answered in 1987 with three crucial decisions pertaining to 
indecency standards.69   
In April 1987, the FCC issued warnings to three separate radio stations for 
indecency violations.70  By doing so, the FCC put these three stations and the rest of 
the broadcasting industry on notice of the new expansive reach of broadcast 
                                                                
58Id. at 739-40. 
59Id. at 739. 
60§ 1464. 
61Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40. 
62Id. at 740. 
63Id. at 741 (“It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to impose precisely the 
same limitations on the dissemination of patently offensive matter by such different means.”); 
see also id. at 741 n.17. 
64Id. at 741. 
65SMITH, supra note 15, at 363. 
66Id.  
67ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49. 
68Id. (citing Julia Reed, Raunch ‘n’ Roll Radio is Here to Stay, US NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, May 4, 1987, at 52). 
69See In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); In re Regents of U. of Cal., 2 
F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); In re Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987). 
70See sources cited supra note 69. 
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indecency regulation.71  The three broadcast companies cited by the FCC to illustrate 
the new policy of indecency regulation were the Pacifica Foundation, the Regents of 
the University of California, and Infinity Broadcasting.72  The Pacifica “broadcast 
[contained] excerpts from a critically acclaimed play called Jerker,” which depicted 
a homosexual dying of AIDS and “included graphic descriptions of homosexual 
encounters.”73  The Regents of the University of California broadcast played a song 
called Makin’ Bacon by the Pork Dukes that contained lyrics with a “significant 
amount of sexual innuendo.”74  The Infinity broadcast was the infamous Howard 
Stern Show, which contained sexual “innuendo and double entendre.”75 
The first order written by the FCC, which was against the Pacifica Foundation, 
stated: 
[W]e take this opportunity to state that, notwithstanding any prior contrary 
indications, we will not apply the Pacifica standard so narrowly in the 
future.  We find that the definition of indecent broadcast material set forth 
in Pacifica appropriately includes a broader range of material than the 
seven specific words at issue in Pacifica.  Those particular words are 
more correctly treated as examples of, rather than a definitive list of, the 
kinds of words that, when used in a patently offensive manner as 
measured by contemporary community standards applicable to the 
broadcast medium, constitute indecency.76 
This statement broadened the scope of indecency regulation well beyond the “seven 
dirty words” used by Carlin.77  The FCC was now focusing on the context of 
broadcasts to determine if an indecency violation existed.78  
Indecency regulation primarily consisted of FCC fines for the next decade and a 
half.79  The period of “deregulation” had ended,80 and broadcasters paid most of the 
fines imposed by the FCC.81  The various broadcast companies paid the fines not 
                                                                
71ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49. 
72See sources cited supra note 69. 
73ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49 (See In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2700). 
74Id. (See In re Regents of the U. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2703). 
75Id. (See In re Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2705 (1987). Howard Stern is the most 
prominent target of the anti-indecency groups battle to rid the airwaves of indecency.  Stern 
has become the poster-child of indecency in America and he is portrayed as the example of 
what is wrong with the content of broadcasting today.  See sources cited supra note 7. 
76In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699. 
77See textual comment supra note 33. 
78SMITH, supra note 15, at 363. 
79ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 55-60 (discussing various cases where fines ranging from 
$2,000 to $600,000 were imposed). 
80ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 55 (citing Caroline E. Mayer, FCC Curbs Radio, TV 
Language; Agency Threatens Stations that are Sexually Explicit, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1987, 
at A1). 
81ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 59. 
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because they agreed with the FCC’s determinations of indecency, but because of the 
opportunity of deregulated business expansion granted in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.82  The FCC and indecency became national topics of discussion with 
the growth of the Internet, the airing of risqué television programs on cable, and 
most notably, the “Janet Jackson incident.”83  The FCC’s statutory authority was no 
longer the primary issue: The First Amendment right of free speech with respect to 
broadcasting and new technologies came to the forefront of the debate. 
B.  The First Amendment and FCC Regulation 
The FCC’s regulation of a medium of communication cannot exist if that 
regulation violates the First Amendment.  The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or the press.”84  First Amendment protection is not so absolute.  The Court 
has upheld many laws prohibiting certain speech as constitutional.85  Content and 
context are critical elements of First Amendment analysis, as Justice Holmes stated 
in Schenck v. United States: 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in 
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their 
constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.  It does not even protect a man from an injunction against 
uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
                                                                
82Id.  Howard Stern had accumulated over $1.7 million in fines owed to the FCC by 
Infinity Broadcasting. Id. The CEO of Infinity, Mel Karmazin, vowed he would not pay the 
fines, preferring instead to compel the FCC into court. Id. However, the chance to expand the 
business proved too much and Infinity settled with the FCC by paying $1.71 million in fines in 
exchange for a clean record. Id. Additionally, any indecency offenses committed in the future 
would be treated as “first” offenses. Id. at 55-60.  Howard Stern had the last laugh.  After years 
of combat with the FCC over indecency on terrestrial radio, Stern signed an extremely 
lucrative deal with Sirius Satellite Radio.  Stern began broadcasting his morning show in 
January of 2006 without any oversight or censorship by the FCC.  See generally Howard Stern 
website, http://www.howardstern.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2007), see also Jacques Steinberg, 
Howard Stern Prepares for Life Without Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at E5. 
83
 FCC Chair Vows to Investigate Halftime Flash, MSNBC, Feb. 4, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4131637. 
84U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
85See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (observing the commonsense 
differences between commercial speech and other types of speech); Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (holding that a statutory classification is constitutional 
when it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (treating libels against private citizens more severely 
than libels against public officials); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that 
obscenity receives no protection under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (allowing the government to prohibit speech that is calculated to provoke 
a physical fight). 
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such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.86 
The FCC’s authority stems directly from Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution.87  Among the listed powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8 
is the power to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause.88  
According to the Supreme Court, the term “commerce” is construed very broadly 
and includes electronic communications89 and deems all radio communication 
interstate.90  Congress used this power to pass the Communications Act, which 
created the FCC and gave it the authority to regulate radio and television 
transmissions.91  The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter in determining 
if the rules and regulations promulgated by the FCC pass constitutional muster and, 
specifically, if the rules violate the First Amendment.92   
When the Court determines if a law prohibiting speech violates the First 
Amendment, one aspect the Court considers is the invasiveness of the 
communication to the listener.93  In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Court 
applied the invasiveness test to determine the constitutionality of a city ordinance 
prohibiting films containing nudity at drive-in theaters.94  In striking down the 
ordinance as unconstitutional, Justice Powell wrote: 
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield 
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more 
offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power.  Such 
selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on 
the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for 
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Constitution does not permit government to decide which types 
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require 
                                                                
86Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted). 
87U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
88U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
89Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, at *9 (1877). 
90Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933). 
9147 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
92U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
93See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (reasoning that “[c]ommunications 
over the Internet do not invade an individual's home”); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744-45 (1996) (“Cable television systems, including 
access channels, have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all 
Americans.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
94See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206, 211-12. 
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protection for the unwilling listener or viewer . . . . [T]he burden normally 
falls upon the viewer to “avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities 
simply by averting [his] eyes.”95  
The invasiveness of the communication proves to be a critical factor in 
determining the constitutionality of a law prohibiting speech as it applies to different 
media of communication.96  The Court continued to employ this test of invasiveness 
to the medium of radio in its analysis of the First Amendment issue in Pacifica.97 
In Pacifica, the Court described two predominant factors that provide for the 
constitutional prohibition of speech in the broadcast medium: (1) the “uniquely 
[established] pervasive presence” of the broadcast media, and (2) the “unique[] 
accessib[ility]” of broadcasts to children.98  The first factor distinguished the medium 
of broadcasting from other forms of speech99 and conferred to it the least amount of 
First Amendment protection.100  Justice Stevens wrote: “Patently offensive, indecent 
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but 
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”101  Consequently, the invasive 
character of broadcasting has allowed the FCC to regulate indecency on the radio 
and television without violating the First Amendment.102 
The second factor, which is frequently given as the driving force behind 
indecency regulation,103 also limited the amount of First Amendment protection 
afforded to broadcasting.104  In Pacifica, the Court recognized “the government’s 
interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority 
in their own household’ justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”105  
Considering the “ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material” 
and the concerns stated above, the Court found ample justification for “special 
treatment of indecent broadcasting.”106  Thus, the protection of a child’s 
                                                                
95Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209-11 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) 
(citations omitted)). 
96See cases cited supra note 93. 
97See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50. 
98Id. at 748-49. 
99For example, the print medium receives more First Amendment protection than does the 
broadcast medium. Khaldoun Shobaki, Speech Restraints for Converged Media, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 333, 337-38 (2004). 
100Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.   
101Id. (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)). 
102See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 46-47. 
103See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 12, 85, 93. 
104Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
105Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)). 
106Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.  Pacifica’s narrowness is illustrated by the Court’s 
determination that the prohibition of broadcast indecent speech is applicable only during times 
when children are the likely listeners of a broadcast.  Id. at 749-50. 
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“psychological well-being”107 permits the FCC to regulate the indecency of 
traditional broadcasts without violating the First Amendment, although “it must do 
so by narrowly drawn regulations.”108 
In Sable Communications of California v. FCC, the Court distinguished the 
constitutionality of the prohibition of free speech as it applied to the protection of 
children in Pacifica from the prohibition of speech at issue in Sable.109  In Sable, the 
FCC banned all indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages, 
commonly known as “dial-a-porn,” under § 223(b) of the Communications Act. 110  
The Court succinctly distinguished the FCC’s reliance on Pacifica as authority for 
the prohibition of indecent telephone messages.111  First, the Court demonstrated that 
Pacifica did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecency, as does the regulation 
in Sable.112  Second, the Court used a “medium-specific” approach to distinguish the 
broadcast medium in Pacifica from the telephone pay service in Sable.113  
In the latter approach, the Court concluded that the telephone communications at 
issue in Sable “are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue in 
Pacifica.”114  Justice White noted several important distinguishing features of the 
dial-it medium: (1) “[T]he listener [must] take affirmative steps to receive the 
communication”; (2) “[t]here is no ‘captive audience’” or unwilling listener; (3) “a 
caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication”; and (4) “a telephone call is 
not the same as turning on a radio.”115  Based upon this medium-specific approach, 
the Court reaffirmed its position that “the government may not ‘reduce the adult 
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.’”116  The Court held “there is no 
constitutional stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of 
obscene commercial telephone recordings,”117 but concluded that “§ 223(b) was not 
                                                                
107Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
108Id. (citations omitted).  In furtherance of this view, Justice White stated, “It is not 
enough to show that the government’s ends are compelling; the means must be carefully 
tailored to achieve those ends.”  Id. 
109Id. at 127-28. 
110Id. at 117-18. 
111Id. at 127. 
112Id. 
113Id. at 127-28. 
114Id. at 127. 
115Id. at 127-28. 
116Id. at 128. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (quoting 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957))). 
117Sable, 492 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added).  Justice Brennan, who concurred in Parts I, II 
and IV of the majority opinion, strongly dissented with regard to the criminal prohibition of 
obscene communication as it relates to the First Amendment.  Id. at 133.  Justice Brennan 
stated in his dissent:   
In my view, however, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A)'s parallel criminal prohibition with 
regard to obscene commercial communications likewise violates the First 
Amendment.  I have long been convinced that the exaction of criminal penalties for 
the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is constitutionally 
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sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that purpose [of prohibiting indecent messages] 
and thus violated the First Amendment.”118  
Similarly, the Court applied the medium-specific approach in Reno v. ACLU, in 
which the Court distinguished new communication technologies from traditional 
broadcasting.  When regulating speech that occurs in traditional broadcasting media, 
the Court will apply a lesser level of First Amendment scrutiny.119  At issue in Reno 
was the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as it 
applied to the Internet.120  In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated the 
District Court’s finding that “the Internet is ‘a unique and wholly new medium of 
worldwide human communication.’”121  Justice Stevens qualified this finding by 
                                                          
intolerable.  In my judgment, “the concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with 
sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and 
distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected 
speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very 
costly institutional harms.”  
. . . [T]he federal parties cannot plausibly claim that their legitimate interest in 
protecting children warrants this Draconian restriction on the First Amendment rights 
of adults who seek to hear the messages that Sable and others provide. 
Id. at 133-35(citation omitted). 
118Id. at 126 (emphasis added).  The FCC continued to insist that without a total ban on 
indecency under § 223(b), the government would not achieve its interest in protecting 
children. Id. at 128-29.  Sable contains an interesting passage whereby the Court politely 
asserts its authority to decide constitutional issues over the insistence of the FCC that the 
Court should defer to Congress’ conclusion: 
To the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’ 
conclusion about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not 
ignore it, it is our task in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the 
Constitution.  This is particularly true where the Legislature has concluded that its 
product does not violate the First Amendment.  Deference to a legislative finding 
cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.... The federal 
parties, however, also urge us to defer to the factual findings by Congress relevant to 
resolving the constitutional issue.  Beyond the fact that whatever deference is due 
legislative findings would not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing 
on an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that the congressional record contains 
no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no 
constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the 
Government’s interest in protecting minors. 
Id. at 129 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted).   
119See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
120Id. at 859-62.  In Reno, two provisions of the CDA were specifically challenged.  
Section 223(a)(1)(B) criminalized the “knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent” 
messages to any recipient under the age of 18.  Id. at 859.  Section 223(d) prohibited the 
“knowing” sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message “that, in context, 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”  Id. at 859-60. 
121Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).  
The Court noted that the District Court “made 410 findings, including 356 paragraphs of the 
parties’ stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court.”  Id. at 849 n.2. 
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distinguishing the Internet and the CDA from the precedents discussed earlier in this 
Note.122 
First, the Court described significant differences between the holdings of Pacifica 
and the CDA.123  The Court focused on the lengthy history of the FCC’s regulation of 
radio broadcasts and that radio broadcast “warnings could not adequately protect the 
listener from unexpected program content.”124  Justice Stevens reasoned that the 
Internet “has no comparable history,” and the risk of accidental encounters with 
indecent material are “remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to 
access specific material” on the Internet.125  Thus, the precedent set forth in Pacifica 
did not require the Court to uphold the CDA and allowed the Court to apply the 
standard of strict scrutiny in reviewing the provisions of the CDA as they applied to 
the First Amendment.126 
Second, the Court distinguished the invasiveness of radio and television from the 
Internet by relying upon the distinctions expressed in Sable.127  Based upon the 
District Court’s findings that the Internet does not invade the home or computer 
screen “by accident,” Justice Stevens pointedly stated: “[T]he Internet is not as 
‘invasive’ as radio or television.”128  While Justice Stevens agreed with the 
“compelling interest [of the government] in protecting the . . . psychological well-
being of minors,” he did not sanction the government’s complete ban on speech 
involving a different medium of communication from that of broadcasting.129  The 
Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that “our cases provide no basis for 
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”130 
Lastly, the Government asserted that its interest in the growth of the Internet 
provided “an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of the CDA.”131  
The Government argued that the unregulated “indecent” and “patently offensive” 
content on the Internet was “driving countless citizens away from the medium 
                                                                
122Id. at 866-70. 
123See id. at 867. 
124Id. 
125Id. 
126See id. at 868.  The Court also addressed the Government’s argument that the precedent 
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. should apply.  Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41 (1986).  In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult movie 
theatres in residential neighborhoods. Renton, 475 U.S. at  53. In Reno, the Government 
attempted to argue that the CDA was a “cyberzoning” ordinance of the Internet. Reno, 521 
U.S. at 868.  Justice Stevens concluded that Renton did not apply because the CDA applied 
too broadly to the entire universe of the Internet and that the CDA was a “content-based 
blanket restriction on speech.” Id.  
127Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70. 
128Id. at 867, 869. 
129Id. at 869-70. 
130Id. at 870. 
131Id. at 885. 
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because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material.”132  
The Court discounted this argument by noting the “phenomenal” growth of the 
Internet and “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”133  Justice Stevens 
concluded the opinion with the following comprehensive statement: “The interest in 
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical 
but unproven benefit of censorship.”134 
The Court, through the precedents discussed above, has set forth various tests and 
approaches to determine the government’s ability to regulate speech and content 
disseminated via the gamut of communication media.  Whether a statute allows 
regulation135 or the First Amendment disallows regulation,136 the Court has shown its 
reluctance to push new communication technologies into the regulatory scope of 
FCC authority.137  The following discussion will analyze and compare wireless 
broadband transmissions with other communication technologies to determine if the 
FCC has the authority to regulate these transmissions by means of traditional 
broadcasts. 
III.  APPLYING THE REGULATORY SCOPE OF FCC AUTHORITY TO NEW 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
A.  An Analysis of Wireless Broadband Transmissions with a Comparison to 
Traditional Broadcast Transmissions 
1. A Statutory Approach 
The anti-indecency media group Morality in Media, Inc. contends that if a signal 
is transmitted over radio airwaves, then it is a broadcast and therefore subject to the 
indecency standards set forth in § 1464.138  Logically, this makes complete sense.  
Legally, however, this is not how the law regulating wireless transmissions is 
designed.139  In 1993, Congress created the statutory classification that wireless 
broadband transmissions are “commercial mobile radio services” (CMRS).140  
Furthermore, § 1464 and this line of statutes are not applicable to CMRS.141  Thus, 
                                                                
132Id. 
133Id. 
134Id. 
135See supra text accompanying notes 31-82. 
136
 See supra text accompanying notes 92-134. 
137See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Reno, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
138See Rockwell, supra note 1. 
139See 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-20 (2005). 
140See 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(10) (2005). 
141See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15 (2005). 
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the FCC possesses no statutory authority to regulate the content of wireless 
broadband transmissions under the indecency standards of § 1464.142 
If current statutory law does not regulate the content of wireless broadband 
transmissions, then in order for the government to have the authority to regulate such 
content, Congress will need to draft new legislation.  Any power granted to the FCC 
by Congressional legislation, if challenged, must ultimately pass the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment scrutiny to be enforceable.143  The following discussion 
will apply the tests set forth by the Supreme Court as described in Part II of this 
Note. 
2. The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Content Prohibitions of Wireless Broadband 
Transmissions 
To determine the constitutionality of a law regulating the content of a new 
medium of communication, the Court will use the medium-specific approach and 
consider the invasiveness of the medium.144  Assuming, arguendo, the accessibility 
and use of wireless broadband transmissions as a medium of communication is most 
similar to the Internet, then the holding of Reno v. ACLU should apply.145  In Reno, 
the Court relied on the invasiveness arguments of Sable to distinguish the Internet 
from radio and television.146  Applying the analysis set forth by Justice White in 
Sable to wireless broadband transmissions should yield the same result as both Sable 
and Reno: (1) The listener (broadband user) must take affirmative steps to receive the 
communication; (2) there is no captive audience or unwilling listener (broadband 
user); (3) a caller (broadband user) seeks and is willing to pay for the 
communication; and (4) a telephone call (broadband connection to the Internet) is 
not the same as turning on a radio.147  If broadband transmissions to wireless devices 
and the Internet are equivalent media of communication, then Justice Stevens’ 
pointed statement from Reno holds true: “[T]he Internet is not as invasive as radio or 
television.”148 
                                                                
142See supra note 139. 
143U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
144See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
145Broadband transmissions are essentially data transmissions over specific radio 
frequencies that have the ability to send extremely large amounts of data.  See JIANGZHOU 
WANG, BROADBAND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: 3G, 4G, AND WIRELESS LAN ch. 1 (2001), 
available at http://www.netlibrary.com.  These large amounts of data enable the user to 
transmit and receive high quality video and audio comparable to home Internet use.  See id.  
The main benefit of broadband technology is that it allows users of hand-held devices to 
directly access and fully browse the Internet without sacrificing viewing quality.  See id.  
Therefore, I argue the content transmitted over wireless broadband technology is equivalent to 
the Internet, and the ruling of Reno v. ACLU should apply to this medium. 
146Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70. 
147Sable, 492 U.S. at 128. 
148Reno, 521 U.S. at 869. 
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In addition to determining the invasiveness of a medium, the Court will consider 
the government’s history of regulating the medium.149  As Justice Stevens found in 
Reno, the Internet “has no comparable history” to that of radio.150  The FCC’s 
lengthy history of regulating the content of traditional broadcasts coupled with the 
“scarcity of available frequencies” and the “invasive nature” of broadcasting has 
provided a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny applicable to those traditional 
broadcasts.151  Thus, with no history of FCC content regulation of wireless 
broadband transmissions, the Court may apply strict scrutiny when reviewing the 
provisions of a law regulating the content of wireless broadband transmissions as it 
applies to the First Amendment.152 
The government’s interest in protecting a child’s “psychological well-being” is 
an accepted concept the Court utilizes when evaluating the constitutionality of a law 
that regulates speech.153  However, the Court will not allow a total ban on protected 
First Amendment speech in order to protect a child from whatever perceived harm 
the speech may cause.154  As with the Internet in Reno, a law banning the indecent 
content of wireless broadband transmissions would “reduce the adult population . . . 
to . . . only what is fit for children.”155  Therefore, relying on the precedent laid down 
in Reno, Sable, Pacifica, and Erznoznik, justification exists for the Court to strike 
down a law regulating the content of broadband wireless transmissions for violating 
the First Amendment under a standard of strict scrutiny. 
B.  A Comparison of Wireless Broadband Technology with Other New 
Communication Technologies 
1. Cable Television 
The one medium of communication that bears a remarkable similarity to the 
broadcast medium is cable television.  The Court extended the rule in Pacifica to 
cable television in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v 
FCC.156  In Denver, the Court held cable television to the lower standard of First 
Amendment protection that, until then, was uniquely afforded to broadcasting.157  
The plurality concluded that all of the factors of Pacifica, such as invasiveness, 
accessibility to children, and ineffectiveness of warnings, also applied to cable 
                                                                
149Id. at 867. 
150Id. 
151Id. at 868. 
152Id. at 867-68.   
153See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
154See Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70.   
155Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 
(1983). 
156Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743-47 (1996). 
157Id. at 744. 
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television.158  This conclusion increased doubts as to whether the narrow holding in 
Pacifica applied only to broadcasting.159   
Five short years later, the Court changed its mind in United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group which was a decision that granted cable television full First 
Amendment protection.160  In rejecting the application of a lower standard of First 
Amendment review for cable television, which is closely related to broadcast 
television, it appears the Court has “foreclose[d] the possibility that Pacifica will 
have any applicability to . . . any other medium outside of broadcasting.”161 
2.  Satellite Radio and Television 
Satellite radio and television also escape FCC indecency regulation for many of 
the same reasons that cable television is not subject to indecency regulation.  
Primarily, users of this medium must subscribe to and pay for the service.162  For 
example, the FCC denied a petition from an FM radio station to apply the indecency 
standards of § 1464 to satellite radio because the statute does not apply to “services 
lacking the indiscriminate access to children that characterizes broadcasting.”163  
Thus, those who subscribe to satellite radio or television affirmatively choose to have 
the content transmitted into their home or vehicle, thereby negating the argument in 
Pacifica that the medium invades an individual’s home.164 
3.  A Comparison 
Wireless broadband transmissions possess many similarities to the above 
technologies, but also one important difference.  Like cable and satellite, wireless 
broadband is a pay service.  It is a pay service that enables the user to connect 
directly to the Internet, which has survived its own challenges of government 
regulation as mentioned above.165  The FCC possesses no authority to regulate 
wireless broadband because 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-20 do not treat these transmissions as 
a broadcast medium.166  This is where the one difference of wireless broadband as 
compared to the other technologies exists: Radio frequencies transmit wireless 
                                                                
158Id. at 744-45. 
159FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978). 
160United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-14 (2000). 
161Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the 
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 301 (2003). 
162Adam Thierer, New Worlds to Censor, WASH. POST, June 7, 2005, at A23. 
163Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to Cable 
Television and Satellite Radio?, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash., 
D.C.) May 2005, at 5, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop12.8indecency.pdf (citing 
Letter from W. Kenneth Ferree, Chief, Media Bureau to Saul Levine, Mt. Wilson FM 
Broadcasters, Inc., DA 04-3907 (Dec. 15, 2004)). 
164See Thierer, supra note 162. 
165See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
166See supra text accompanying notes 138-43. 
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broadband information.167  Congress possesses the power to write new statutes168 that 
could pull these frequencies into the broadcast realm and thereby rendering them 
subject to indecency standards.169  However, strict scrutiny would apply to these new 
statutes under a First Amendment challenge.170 
Currently, the FCC does not regulate transmitted indecency on any of the 
aforementioned media.  The various industries related to these media have employed 
self-regulation as a means of controlling the amount of or access to indecency.171  
Recently, the cable and satellite industries took a major step regarding self-
regulatory measures.  The cable and satellite industries have announced that they will 
be offering “family-tier” program packages to subscribers of their respective 
services.172  Pressure from anti-indecency media groups, Congress, and the FCC 
prompted these industries to offer these packages.173   
The wireless industry, represented by the Cellular Telecommunications and 
Internet Association (CTIA), released its own set of guidelines to help inform the 
public of the type of content that is available through a carrier’s service.174  These 
guidelines do not apply to any content accessible through the Internet.175  These 
guidelines apply only to the content offered by the carrier.176  Similar to the cable and 
satellite industry, the wireless industry proposed these guidelines in order to stave off 
attempts by the government and anti-indecency groups to initiate FCC regulation of 
their medium.177 
IV. THE POLITICS OF FCC INDECENCY REGULATION 
A. Various Anti-Indecency Media Groups and their Influence on FCC Policy 
There are those who wish for the content regulation of wireless transmissions and 
those who do not.  Regardless of the position taken, those opposing sides will 
attempt to influence the FCC and Congress to further their agenda through various 
                                                                
167See supra note 145. 
168U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
169See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). 
170See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, (2000); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
171See, e.g., Glen Garvin, Horror Episode Too Graphic for Edgy Showtime Series, MIAMI 
HERALD, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/Miamiherald 
entertainment/television/13676679.htm?source=rss&channel=miamiherald_television. 
172See LaRue Cook, Senators Debate How to Protect Kids from TV Indecency, INFOZINE, 
Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/12481/.  
173See Cook, supra note 172; see also Corn-Revere, supra note 163, at 4. 
174See Stephen Lawson, Industry Group Fights Cell Phone Smut: CTIA Introduces 
Voluntary Pledge to Restrict Access to Adult Content, PC WORLD, Nov. 10, 2005, 
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,123484,00.asp. 
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methods.  The following discussion briefly introduces some of the factions involved 
on both sides of the debate. 
1. Morality in Media, Inc. 
Founded in 1968 by Father Morton A. Hill, Morality in Media, Inc. (MIM) states 
that its mission is “to address two pressing moral and cultural [evils]: (1) The 
exploitation of obscenity in the marketplace; and (2) The erosion of decency 
standards in the media.”178  MIM attempts to accomplish this mission by lobbying 
elected government officials, lobbying members of the FCC, filing complaints with 
the FCC, and promoting its philosophy to the public through its website and legal 
center.179  MIM operates the National Obscenity Law Center in New York City that it 
founded in 1976.180  The appointment to a pair of indecency commissions by 
Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan is an example of Father Hill’s and 
MIM’s access to the government regarding indecency policy.181  
The networking, organization, and resources that MIM possesses have 
continually placed them at the forefront of the fight against indecency in America.182  
MIM excels at using its knowledge of the law to try to influence government and 
FCC policy on indecency.183  Although MIM makes many headlines and has direct 
contact with numerous lawmakers and FCC officials,184 their attempt to regulate and 
abolish indecency in the media has waned185 as it is in direct conflict with the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedent.186  Thus, only a change in the 
Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to different media of 
communication will enable MIM to accomplish its goals. 
                                                                
178ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 64. See also Morality in Media, Inc., 
http://www.moralityinmedia.org. 
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hyperlink). 
181See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 64-66.  MIM was directly involved with, if not 
responsible for, Pacifica.  Id. at 68-69.  The one complaint about Carlin’s monologue came 
from a member of MIM’s national planning board.  Id. at 68-69.  MIM also submitted an 
amicus brief in the Pacifica case.  Id. at 69.  In addition, “MIM advised a woman in 
Philadelphia on how to prepare one of the complaints” to the FCC that initiated the three April 
1987 decisions discussed previously.  Id. at 69.  For further examples of MIM’s contributions 
to indecency regulation, see ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 63-127 and MIM’s website, 
http://www.moralityinmedia.org. 
182See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 68; see also Morality in Media, Inc., http://www.morality 
inmedia.org. 
183See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 65-66 (MIM’s National Obscenity Law Center is “a 
clearinghouse of information on the law of obscenity”). 
184Id. at 68-71 (MIM met with FCC commissioners to pressure enforcement). 
185Id. at 69. 
186See supra text accompanying notes 93-134 (discussing Supreme Court precedent). 
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2.  The American Family Association 
Don Wildmon founded the American Family Association (AFA) in 1977 to 
promote “family values” and to educate people “on the influence of television and 
other media - including pornography - on our society.”187  AFA claims to have nearly 
three million supporters,188 and its primary tactic against indecency is the economic 
boycott.189  Through these boycotts, the AFA has had more success against 
individual companies than they have had in changing indecency policy within the 
FCC.190  Consequently, the AFA has received many headlines comparable to those of 
MIM,191 but likewise, the AFA has been unable to make significant changes to the 
FCC’s regulation of indecency.192 
3. Similar Groups and the FCC’s Reactions to them 
Other groups with a similar agenda to that of MIM and AFA are the Parents 
Television Council (PTC) and Concerned Women for America (CWA).193  The 
president of the PTC, Brent Bozell, believes any self-regulation by the entertainment 
industry is flawed because the industry downplays what is indecent for the sake of 
advertising dollars.194  Mr. Bozell therefore believes the device known as the “V-
chip”195 is flawed because it blocks programming that is deemed indecent by the 
                                                                
187See American Family Association, http://www.afa.net/about.asp. 
188Id.  
189See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 81. 
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191See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 63-127. 
192Id. For example, AFA was unable to persuade the FCC to stop Infinity Broadcasting 
from acquiring more stations that would in turn air the Howard Stern show. Id. at 80. 
193See Parents Television Council, http://www.parentstv.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2007); 
Concerned Women for America, http://www.cwfa.org/main.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
194See Cook, supra note 172. 
195The V-chip, which is “embedded in all new TV sets” sold in the United States, has the 
ability to “block specific programming.”  Id.  The purpose of the V-chip is to allow 
individuals, namely parents, to voluntarily block unwanted or indecent programming in order 
to protect children from exposure to such programs. Thomas Hazlett, Requiem for the V-Chip: 
A Relic of the Last Battle Over Indecency on TV, SLATE, Feb. 13, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2095396/. The television industry prefers the V-chip and self-
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network studios, not the FCC.196  As a result, the PTC, along with the CWA, lobbied 
the FCC and Congress to promote the idea of the “family-friendly programming 
packages.”197  Although Congress and the FCC did not mandate the availability of 
the family tier,198 for several years the FCC steadily pressured the cable and satellite 
industry to provide this option to its subscribers.199  In January of 2006, the three 
largest cable television companies and the two primary satellite television providers 
announced they would be providing a family-friendly tier package for users of their 
respective services.200   
While self-regulatory measures appear to be making progress, FCC indecency 
sanctions have declined.  The year 2004 produced record fines imposed by the FCC 
of $7.9 million for broadcast indecency violations, whereas the FCC did not issue 
any fines for indecency violations in the year 2005.201  This fact prompted statements 
from the PTC expressing disappointment in the FCC’s enforcement of broadcast 
indecency.202  The PTC believes that the inaction by the FCC may encourage 
broadcasters to air indecent content on television without the fear of fines imposed 
by the FCC.203  In response, the FCC states it will act soon on pending complaints.204  
Additionally, the FCC hired a former board member of the CWA as a special advisor 
in the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis.205  This move may usher in a 
new era of indecency regulation and now provides the anti-indecency media groups 
with an insider as a member of the FCC hierarchy.   
Despite these various groups’ successes and failures to influence and change 
FCC indecency policy, corporate America may wield even greater power than the 
aforementioned groups. 
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B.  Corporate America’s Influence on FCC Policy 
The anti-indecency media groups’ specific agenda is to abolish indecency in 
broadcasting, while corporate America’s only agenda is to make money.  
Corporations truly do not possess a profound interest in whether a First Amendment 
violation occurs.  In order for corporate America to succeed with its agenda, it must 
prevent government regulation of its respective industries as much as possible.  
Establishing self-regulatory measures is one method to keep the government from 
regulating one’s industry.206  Another common and effective method is to lobby 
Congress and the FCC.207   
Whoever possesses the most money usually lobbies most effectively.208  
Compared to the anti-indecency media groups, the enormous corporations involved 
in the cable, telecommunications, and Internet industries clearly have the ability to 
spend more time and money lobbying Congress and the FCC.  To illustrate, the 
telephone and cable companies are currently attempting to lobby Congress to weaken 
communication laws in order to operate and control the Internet more like a private 
network.209  This may allow for unregulated content on the Internet, but it will also 
limit who may partake in placing content on the Internet or who may access this 
content.210  If there is too much regulation, then ideas are suppressed.  If there is too 
little regulation, then major corporations may determine which ideas are viewed.211  
Internet accessibility may ultimately be determined according to how Congress 
chooses to regulate the Internet’s access network, either by keeping it neutral or 
making it private.212  Accordingly, this decision will directly affect both commerce 
and the freedom of speech. 
V. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF WIRELESS CONTENT REGULATION BY THE FCC 
The regulation of wireless content by the FCC through a traditional broadcast 
lens will have a tremendous chilling effect on free speech and commerce in the 
United States.  The Supreme Court, the FCC, the anti-indecency groups, and 
corporate America each have an objective to secure in addressing the issue of 
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25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
424 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:399 
wireless content regulation.  Finding a solution that appeases all parties without 
stifling free speech or commerce is presumably unattainable. 
A. The Effect on the Freedom of Speech 
To regulate the content of wireless broadband transmissions is to regulate content 
on the Internet.213  The predominant use of wireless broadband is to connect to the 
Internet through handheld devices.  The CTIA estimates the number of wireless 
subscribers in the United States at 242 million.214  The Internet has become and 
continues to progress as the primary global communication medium.  Thus, 
regulating the content of wireless broadband transmissions is an indirect method of 
regulating content on the Internet.215   
In Reno, the Court struck down a law that regulated indecent content on the 
Internet.216  The Court stated that a “content-based regulation of speech . . . raises 
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free 
speech.”217  Wireless and Internet media essentially have the ability to transmit all 
forms of communication, including telephone, newspapers, magazines, television, 
music, movies, photographs, etc.  By regulating wireless transmissions to protect 
minors, the government would be regulating all media of communication, thereby 
suppressing “a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to 
receive and to address to one another.”218 
The enactment of a law regulating the indecent content of wireless broadband 
transmissions would create a precedent that could extend regulation to other, if not 
all, media of communication.  The First Amendment freedom of speech cannot be 
placed upon this slippery slope.  The fundamental right of freedom of speech 
maintains our democratic society by allowing every individual to express his or her 
thoughts, beliefs, and values irrespective of any other individual’s approval or 
agreement with those expressions.   
The unlimited communication capabilities of wireless broadband and the Internet 
“can hardly be considered a scarce expressive commodity.”219  As the Court in Reno 
noted, “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”220  The Court 
continued: “In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly 
clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the 
First Amendment.’”221  If strict scrutiny does not apply to any law attempting to 
regulate the content of wireless broadband transmissions, then Americans’ speech 
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may be reduced to what the government construes to be appropriate and decent. The 
Court has recognized that  ‘“regardless of the strength of the government’s interest’ 
in protecting children, ‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox [or handheld 
wireless device] simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a 
sandbox.’”222 
B. The Effect on Commerce 
FCC regulation of wireless broadband content would have an economic effect on 
every type of entity and organization from government and business to the 
individual.  Decisions made by the FCC and Congress regarding regulation of this 
expanding technology are critical.  Not only is there the obvious loss of money if 
regulation ensues, but the competitiveness of the United States in the global 
economy is at stake.223 
The United States government stands to gain an immediate financial windfall 
based on the demand for wireless broadband.  The FCC is scheduled to begin the 
sale of wireless licenses on June 29, 2006 and continue to do so through 2009.224  
The Bush Administration projects to raise $25 billion from the sale of licenses.225  In 
the long term, no one has projected the possible tax revenue generated from the tens 
of millions of future users of wireless broadband, let alone the tax revenue from the 
commerce conducted over these networks.  The regulation of content on wireless 
broadband does not appear to be in the best financial interest of the government.   
When the FCC addresses wireless broadband issues, it has conflicting internal 
goals.  The FCC’s chief, Kevin Martin, believes “[i]t is critical that consumers have 
unfettered access to the Internet and all the services it provides.”226  Mr. Martin also 
stated in a recent interview that “[t]he changes that are occurring in 
telecommunications today are affecting every aspect of the way people are 
interacting.”227 He argued that “getting affordable broadband service to every 
household must be the commission’s top priority.”228  Finally, he noted that “we’re 
going to see quite dramatic changes, but what’s critical for all of those changes is 
increasing connections, increasing connection speeds and making sure it’s 
ubiquitously and affordably done for everyone in the country.  And increasingly that 
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it’s even done wirelessly.”229 However, Mr. Martin and the FCC still have to answer 
to requests for increasing indecency regulation that directly opposes the expansion of 
wireless broadband.  To address these indecency matters Mr. Martin states his “goal 
is to make sure the concerns of parents get addressed, and I’ve always thought 
there’s a variety of ways that we could end up doing that.”230  Without stating the 
specific ways, it appears Mr. Martin and the FCC will focus on wireless expansion, 
and then address the indecency concerns. 
The businesses that are in position to capitalize on the growth of wireless 
broadband include those who will provide the access, those who will make the 
devices, and those who will provide the content.  In order for the government to 
receive $25 billion for the sale of licenses, it is obvious that large access providers 
must be willing to pay for these licenses.231  In addition to access costs to the wireless 
broadband network, users may need to pay for content, which is unlike traditional 
Internet use.232  The pay-for-content aspect of wireless broadband may be a new 
source of revenue for traditional media companies.233  Therefore, the regulation of 
wireless broadband content will adversely affect consumer demand for wireless use 
and result in reduced revenue for the government and business as well as investment 
in the technology. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under current statute and application of Supreme Court precedent and methods 
of analysis, the FCC has no authority to extend traditional broadcast indecency 
regulations to wireless broadband content.  The Supreme Court has not applied the 
rule set forth in Pacifica to media of communication other than traditional broadcast 
radio and television.  As technology continues to integrate media of communication, 
the line between traditional broadcast and other media will continue to blur.  
Possibly, this line will blur to a point where there will be no line and only wireless 
broadband communications exist.  If that occurs, Pacifica may have no place in 
indecency analysis.  Conversely, Pacifica may be revived and control indecency 
analysis if there exists only one primary medium of communication.   
To regulate wireless broadband in its infancy as the anti-indecency groups desire 
will impede the growth of this technology and infringe upon the First Amendment 
rights of all Americans.  The United States must be able to compete globally with 
this emergent technology.  Consequently, Congress and the FCC must strike a 
delicate balance in fostering and cultivating wireless broadband.  On one hand, the 
Supreme Court must protect the First Amendment rights of Americans from 
overreaching regulation.  On the other hand, the current policy of deregulation 
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among communication companies presents its own set of harms to avoid.  “The 
problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is 
dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not 
necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years 
hence.”234  Perhaps Justice Burger’s foreshadowing statement places the issue in 
perspective. 
                                                                
234Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
